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I. INTRODUCTION
The late 1970's and early 1980's have seen a tremendous in-
crease in the number of child sexual abuse cases in the criminal
justice system.' The perceived inherent weakness of these cases,
which often pitted a young traumatized child against a seemingly
respectable adult, caused many prosecutors to bolster their cases
with expert testimony. This expert testimony ran the gambit from
testimony that delays in reporting are common' to testimony that
a particular child victim was telling the truth.$ Several cases have
finally progressed through the appellate systems of various states,
and as with other evidentiary issues, decisions have varied from
state to state. There are, however, enough well-reasoned cases to
make some general observations and conclusions about what kind
of expert testimony will be permissable in future child sexual
abuse cases.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
In examining the admissibility of expert testimony in child
sexual abuse cases, the court must apply the general rules of evi-
* Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Supervisor, Special Assault Unit, Seattle,
Washington; B.A. 1973, University of Washington; J.D. 1977, University of Puget Sound.
1. Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence, Final Report, September 1984.
2. Washington v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 569, 683 P.2d 173, 176 (1984).
3. Hawaii v. Kim, 64 Hawaii 598, 601, 645 P.2d 1330, 1334 (1982).
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dence applicable to all expert opinion.4 The analysis is two
pronged: 1) Is the evidence admissible, and 2) does the probative
value outweigh the prejudicial impact?' To fulfill the admissibility
requirement, the court must determine whether the expert testi-
mony will aid the trier of fact in evaluating and understanding
matters that are not within the common experience of the jurors.'
If the jury requires assistance in understanding the subject matter,
a qualified expert may introduce testimony, provided that the
opinion is reliable. 7 Reliability generally means that opinion is ac-
cepted within the particular field.9 If the court decides that the
presentation of expert testimony is appropriate for the subject
matter, that the expert is qualified and that the opinion is reliable,
the court then must balance the probative value of the evidence
against the prejudicial impact upon the trier of fact.'
III. THE WASHINGTON CASES
The formation of a specialized unit in the King County Prose-
cuting Attorney's Office in the State of Washington to handle child
abuse and sexual assault cases, as well as the proximity and close
interaction of that unit with the Sexual Assault Center in Seattle,
Washington, led to a great number of child sexual assault cases in
Washington in which the prosecution offered expert testimony. No
fewer than ten Washington appellate court opinions concern such
4. F D. R. EvD. 702:
RULE 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
5. This two pronged analysis is derived from the recognition that expert testimony oth-
erwise admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 703 may be subject to exclusion under
Federal Rules of Evidence 403 if the probative value of the proffered expert testimony is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See United States v. Schmidt,
711 F.2d 595, 599 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041 (1984) (recognizing that
"[eixpert testimony, like any other testimony, may be excluded if, compared to its probative
worth, it would create a substantial danger of undoe prejudice or confusion.").
6. Holmgren v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 516 F.2d 856, 858 (8th Cir. 1975).
7. In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d 238, 276 (3d Cir. 1983).
8. FED. R. EvID. 703:
RULE 703. BASES OF OPINION TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence.
9. See supra note 5.
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expert testimony.'0 Hence, the principles and limitations of expert
testimony have been clearly delineated in Washington. A brief his-
tory of the theories of admissibility and appellate reactions to
these evidentiary approaches may prove helpful in analyzing other
cases.
Initially, based on the authority of Ibn-Tamas v. United
States," a persuasive opinion on spousal battering, Washington
prosecutors called social workers from the sexual assault field as
expert witnesses to assist the trier of fact in understanding the vic-
tims' delay in reporting the crime. The experts also were asked to
explain, by implication, how these assaults could go undetected for
years. Impressive statistics showed the frequency of sexual abuse
and how often it was committed by friends or family members.
The experts offered reasons for the failure to timely report these
crimes, which included fear of reprisals, fear of being blamed, fear
of terminating relationships, and the obeyance of parental orders.
The Washington Court of Appeals also admitted such testimony in
a "battered child syndrome" case.1'
Unfortunately, in the first of a series of child sexual abuse
cases, the Washington Court of Appeals adversely affected the fu-
ture admissiblity of this type of expert testimony. In Washington
v. Steward,"3 the court focused on statistical information although
that was not the real value of the testimony.'4 Steward was a child
abuse homicide case in which the defendant, Steward, offered tes-
timony that the child reacted so positively to him that he could
not have been the one who abused and eventually murdered the
child." ' The prosecutor asked an expert physician on child abuse a
general question about who was statistically responsible for serious
10. The following cases include unpublished opinions without precedential value in
Washington, but they further develop the analysis of the Washington courts of appeal:
Washington v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 683 P.2d 173 (1984); Washington v. Fitzgerald, 39
Wash. App. 652, 694 P.2d 1117 (1985); Washington v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 667 P.2d
96 (1983); Washington v. Steward, 34 Wash. App. 221, 660 P.2d 278 (1983); Washington v.
Mitchell, No. 12040.9-I (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1984); Washington v. Hardison, Nos. 12438-
2-1, 13771-9-1 (Wash. Ct. App. July 19, 1984); Washington v. LaLonde, No. 12995-3-1
(Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 1983); Washington v. Garza. No. 11979-6-I (Wash. Ct. App. Dec.
14, 1983); Washington v. McQuade, No. 11607-0-I (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 1983); Washing-
ton v. Grant, No. 10538-8-I (Wash. Ct. App. June 13, 1983); Washington v. Turrey, No.
10206-1-I (Wash. Ct. App. July 12, 1982); Washington v. Freeman, No. 7830-5-I (Wash. Ct.
App. Nov. 24, 1980).
11. 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979).
12. Washington v. Mulder, 29 Wash. App. 513, 516, 629 P.2d 462, 464 (1981).
13. 34 Wash. App. 221, 660 P.2d 278 (1983).
14. Id, at 223, 660 P.2d 278 (1983).
15. Washington v. Steward, No. 80-1-03566-1 (King County Sup. Ct. March 31, 1981).
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assaults of children. The prosecutor intended to establish that love
toward a parental figure does not necessarily establish that that
person did not harm the child." In response to the question, the
expert physician stated that, in eight out of nine serious assault
cases involving single mothers, live-in or babysitting boyfriends in-
flict the injuries.17 The trial court admitted the testimony.
On appeal, the court did not view this evidence as a rebuttal
to the defense attorney's argument that the close relationship be-
tween the child and the babysitter precluded the defendant's guilt.
Rather, the court said that the trial court admitted the evidence to
show statistically that, because boyfriends of single mothers are
most often responsible for assaults of the women's child and be-
cause the defendant was, in this case, the mother's boyfriend, the
defendant probably was guilty. Thus, the court held that it was
reversible error to admit such prejudicial expert testimony.16
The court then viewed, in the same light, the expert testimony
that the prosecution presented in the first sexual abuse case,
Washington v. Maule.1a In Maule, the court held by implication
that it would be reversible error to allow any expert statistical tes-
timony showing who would be most likely to abuse children be-
cause the inference of guilt was prejudicial'20 The court, therefore,
reversed the conviction of Maule for abusing his eight and five-
year-old daughters because the social worker testified, in the
course of establishing her qualifications, that the majority of child
abuse cases involve a male parent figure, particularly biological fa-
thers, and the defendant, in Maule, was a biological father."1
Again, the court focused on the state's use of the expert testimony
to characterize the defendant as a person likely to abuse children
rather than to explain to the jury why victims often delay report-
ing the abuse.2 The court also expressed serious reservations
about the entire field of expert evidence in child sexual abuse
cases.'
3
16. Steward, 34 Wash. App. at 223, 660 P.2d at 279.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 224, 660 P.2d at 280.
19. 35 Wash. App. 287, 667 P.2d 96 (1983).
20. Id. at 293, 667 P.2d at 99.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 296, 667 P.2d at 100.
23. In State v. Maule, the Washington Court of Appeals reviewed the general rules
about expert testimony and stated:
Ousley's testimony may present issues arising under both ER 702 and ER 703.
For example, Ousley's theory that sexually abused children manifest partic-
ular identifiable characteristics was not shown to be supported by accepted med-
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In a series of related but unpublished decisions, the Washing-
ton courts permitted prosecutors to call expert witnesses to give
opinion testimony as to whether the delayed revelation of abuse
was "inconsistent with the abuse having occurred." 4 The answer,
of course, was always no. The courts affirmed the defendant's con-
ical or scientific opinion. If no correlation between particular characteristics and
established cases of sexual abuse is shown (through Ousley's own scientific study
or other professional studies), such testimony amounts to a discussion of child
sexual abuse in general and is therefore collateral to the question of whether a
particular child was sexually abused. Under such circumstances, a trial judge
could reasonably conclude the proffered testimony lacks sufficient probative
value to "assist the trier of fact" as required by ER 702.
Even if Ousley's theory possesses probative value, in the abstract, the record
does not show the underlying facts or data are of a type "reasonably relied upon
by experts in the particular field." ER 703. There is no evidence that Ousley
conducted any statistical study or that any other expert in the field made such a
study. There is no evidence that people working in the field attach particular
significance to one or more characteristics and whether certain broad character-
istics noted by Ousley, e.g., "nightmares," are, without further explanation, con-
sidered adequate indicia of child sexual abuse. Nor is there evidence showing
how, for Ousley's analysis, a case of child sexual abuse is established. Is it by
criminal conviction, agreement to accept treatment, admission by the defendant
or someone's opinion? What is the basis of analysis employed by other profes-
sionals in the field?
Id. at 295-96, 667 P.2d at 100 (citations omitted).
In Minnesota v. Sadana, the Minnesota Supreme Court expressed concern about the
lack of scientific reliability of child sexual abuse syndrome evidence as it relates to the be-
havior of victims during and after abuse. 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1984). Saldana was an
adult rape case wherein a psychiatrist testified that the victim suffered "rape trauma syn-
drome." The court rejected the use of a psychiatric evaluation as a method of proving rape:
Rape trauma syndrome is not the type of scientific test that accurately and re-
liabfly determines whether a rape has occurred. The characteristic symptoms
may follow any psychologically traumatic event. At best, the syndrome describes
only symptoms that occur with some frequency, but makes no pretense of
describing every single case ....
The scientific evaluation of rape trauma syndrome has not reached a level of
reliability that surpasses the quality of common sense evaluation present in jury
deliberations.
Id. at 229-30 (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIc ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSIc AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL. oF MENTAL DisoRDEs 236 (3d ed. 1980); C. WARNER, RAPE AND SzXUAL ASSAULT
145 (1980).
In Saldana, the court concluded that "[rnape trauma syundrome is not a fact-finding
tool, but a therapeutic tool useful in counseling." Id. at 230. The court also expressed con-
cern that the portion of the expert's opinion testimony stating that the victim was raped
was of no real benefit to the jury, but was unfairly prejudicial by giving "'a stamp of scien-
tifc legitimacy to the truth of the complaining witness's factual testimony."' Id. at 231
(quoting People v. Izzo, 90 Mich. App. 727, 730, 282 N.W.2d 10, 11 (1979)).
24. Washington v. LaLonde, No. 12995-3-I (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 1983); Washington
v. Garza, No. 11979-6-I (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1983); Washington v. Grant, No. 10538-8-I
(Wash. Ct. App. June 13, 1983). Contra Washington v. McQuade, No. 11607-0-I (Wash. Ct.
App. Aug. 22, 1983).
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viction in all of the cases.
The Supreme Court of Washington finally addressed the issue
in Washington v. Petrich.26 The Petrich court found that the trial
court properly admitted the expert testimony of a social worker
from the Sexual Assault Center. In three years she had dealt with
more than 3,000 cases of sexual abuse. Based on her experience as
a social worker, she testified that delays in reporting varied from a
few days to a few weeks, and that the length of the delay was re-
lated to the relationship of the parties."6 The longest delays oc-
curred when the child knew the offender. 27
All of the Washington cases, including the most recent case,
Washington v. Fitzgerald,6 which involved a Boeing executive
who molested three young girls from India after adopting them,
precluded an expert from giving an opinion as to whether the child
victim was telling the truth. The court pointed out in dicta, how-
ever, that having a pediatrician state her opinion that the girls
were molested, when there was no physical evidence of sexual
abuse, was tantamount to asking her to render an opinion on the
truthfulness of the girls' statements."9 The Fitzgerald court cited
three rape trauma syndrome cases'0 in support of its holding that
it is impermissible to allow opinion testimony on credibility be-
cause it usurps the fact finding function of the jury.31 In an unpub-
lished opinion, the Washington Court of Appeals similarly rejected
expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome as an improper usurpa-
tion of the jury's function as finders of fact. 3'
The courts have formed three general theories concerning ex-
pert testimony in sexual abuse cases. The author will apply these
theories to the Washington cases as an illustration before applying
them to the decisions of courts in other states. First, only the most
liberal view of admissibility would permit calling an expert to
render an opinion as to the truthfulness or credibility of a witness.
The Washington courts, in Petrich33 and Fitzgerald3 4 certainly re-
25. 101 Wash. 2d 566, 683 P.2d 173 (1984).
26. Id. at 576, 683 P.2d at 180.
27. Id. at 569, 683 P.2d at 176.
28. 39 Wash. App. 652, 694 P.2d 1117 (1985).
29. Id. at 657, 694 P.2d at 1121.
30. Id. (citing Massachusetts v. Carter, 9 Mass. App. 680, 403 N.E.2d 1191 (1980), aff'd,
383 Mass. 873, 417 N.E.2d 438 (1981); Missouri v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984); North
Carolina v. Keer, 309 N.C. 158, 305 S.E.2d 535 (1983)).
31. Washington v. Fitzgerald, 39 Wash. App. at 657, 694 P.2d at 1121.
32. Washington v. Freeman, No. 7830-5-I (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 1980).
33. 101 Wash. 2d 566, 683 P.2d 173 (1984).
34. 39 Wash. App. 652, 694 P.2d 1117 (1985).
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jected this view. Second, a moderate theory would attempt to bol-
ster the victim's testimony without direct comment as to the vic-
tim's credibility. Some courts are hostile toward expert testimony
that bolsters the victim's testimony. For example, the Fitzgerald
court indicated that it would not uphold the admission of a physi-
cian's expert testimony because the only purpose of the testimony
was to bolster the child's story. The third and most conservative
position would allow the admission of expert testimony only to ex-
plain or rebut a defense argument, such as the typical defense ar-
gument that a delay in reporting means that the child fabricated
the crime.
The Washington courts probably have adopted the conserva-
tive approach, which offers a clear baseline for admission in almost
all jurisdictions. This position is probably the most true to Rules
702 and 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 5 Washington courts
liberally admit battered women's syndrome evidence when defen-
dants introduce it; courts usually liberally construe the evidentiary
rules in favor of defendants."
IV. THEORIES OF ADMISSIBILITY
The application of these three general categories to other ju-
risdictions is a logical construct for an analysis of the cases. The
35. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides for expert testimony when it
will assist the trier of fact in understanding some fact that is not within the common under-
standing of the jury. See United States v. Webb, 625 F.2d 709, 711 (5th Cir. 1980). The data
or opinion must be of a kind upon which those in the field rely. See supra note 7. In Fitz-
gerald, the court expressed reservations about compliance with Rule 703, claiming physi-
cians do not reasonably rely on what patients tell them to form a diagnosis. 39 Wash. App.
at 657, 694 P.2d at 1121. This is not a legitimate complaint, particularly where mental
health professionals are involved. Defense psychiatric and psychological experts routinely
form opinions about defendants' mental health status at the time of a crime and render
those opinions based primarily on the self-report of the defendant. Washington v. Eaton, 30
Wash. App. 288, 294, 633 P.2d 921, 925 (1981). The court's reluctance to let mental health
professionals place the same weight on the self-report of victims is discriminatory and sex-
ist. After all, a defendant has far more incentive to fabricate and distort his self-report than
does a victim.
Objections to the use of this evidence under Rule 702, however, are better placed.
Courts should permit prosecution experts to explain the reasons why child sexual abuse
victims often delay reporting the crime if the defense argues that the delay in reporting is
indicative of fabrication. Yet, the courts should not allow the prosecutors to suggest that a
delay in reporting is affirmative proof that the child was sexually abused, because there is no
data to suggest that one can determine the legitimacy of an allegation of sexual abuse by the
length of time that passes between cessation of abuse and its disclosure to authorities.
36. Washington v. Kelly, 102 Wash. 2d 188, 685 P.2d 564 (1984); Washington v. Allery,
101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984); Washington v. Walker, 40 Wash. App. 658, 700 P.2d
1168 (1985).
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Supreme Court of Hawaii's decision in Hawaii v. Kim best repre-
sents the liberal admissibility rule.37 The conservative view is best
illustrated by the Tennessee approach in Tennessee v. Curtis,"
while the Supreme Court of Washington enunciated the moderate
position in Petrich.s9
A. The Liberal View
In Hawaii v. Kim, the Supreme Court of Hawaii permitted an
expert psychiatrist to testify as to the credibility of the victim, a
thirteen-year-old girl who was sexually abused by her step-father."'
The psychiatrist based his opinion as to the victim's truthfulness
on several factors, including the consistency of the account, her
emotional reactions such as fear and depression, and on whether
she had a negative view of sex. 1 Other courts also have permitted
experts to give opinions as to the victim's truthfulness in less
clearly stated terms.' 2 The Supreme Court of Hawaii, however, also
acknowledged the dangers inherent in the introduction of this tes-
timony: the expert may usurp the jury's fact finding function; the
trial may become a battle between experts; and the victim's pri-
vacy may be invaded.43 The court viewed the value of such evi-
dence to the jury as outweighing these dangers."'
The potential impact of the analysis of the Supreme Court of
Hawaii is far-reaching and detrimental. As any trial attorney
knows, for every expert who will say black, another will say white.
If the state allows a witness to testify as to the victim's truthful-
ness, the defendant similarly will be entitled to call a witness to
testify to the contrary. The victim will undoubtedly be subjected
to repeated psychological and psychiatric testing. Moreover, the at-
tendant invasions of the child's privacy, together with the numer-
ous recitations of the facts of the abuse, is likely to cause further
psychological damage to the child. This is obviously counter-pro-
ductive. Further, the Supreme Court of Hawaii implied that a vic-
tim of sexual abuse, like others of questionable mental status with
respect to whom expert testimony is generally accepted, is some-
37. 64 Hawaii at 598, 607-08, 645 P.2d 1330, 1338.
38. No. 114, slip op. at 14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 1981).
39. 101 Wash. 2d at 566, 683 P.2d at 180.
40. 64 Hawaii at 600-01, 645 P.2d at 1333-34.
41. Id. at 601, 645 P.2d at 1333.
42. Massachusetts v. Carter, 9 Mass. App. 680, 403 N.E.2d 1191 (1981).
43. 64 Hawaii at 606-07, 645 P.2d at 1337.
44. Id. at 607-08, 645 P.2d 1338 (1982).
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how equally mentally ill or disturbed.4 5 In sum, solicitation of ex-
pert opinion as to the credibility or truthfulness of a child sexual
assault victim does not seem legally sound or practically wise.
B. The Conservative Approach
In contrast to the liberal approach, Tennessee adopted a con-
servative approach in Tennesse v. Curtis." In Curtis, a four-year-
old girl witnessed a neighbor murder her mother. A psychologist
testified that children from three to eight years old generally know
the difference between right and wrong and are less likely to relate
incorrect information than older children or adults. 7 The Supreme
Court of Tennessee ruled that the expert's testimony was inadmis-
sible, despite its apparent suitability for expert testimony, given
the "common understanding" that young children are given to
"flights of fantasy." 8
The Supreme Court of Tennessee's approach in Curtis is un-
warranted and extremely harmful to the prosecution of child sex-
ual abuse cases. The implication that the victim imagined or
fantasized the sexual abuse is an undercurrent in every case involv-
ing very young children. Expert witnesses are needed in this area
not to render opinions as to whether a child is telling the truth but
to generally describe the principles of the emotional development
of children and to counter the implicit defense of fabrication or
imagination.'
45. Id. at 607, 645 P.2d at 1337-38.
Other courts and commentators have recognized such situations to include
those involving the allegedly mentally ill witness and the mentally retarded wit-
ness... and, as in this case, child complainants whose claims are substantially
uncorroborated.
Id. (citations ommitted).
Evidence equating child sexual abuse victims with mentally retarded or mentally ill
witnesses is misplaced. Many jurors may be unfamiliar with the developmental characteris-
tics of a retarded person. They may need the benefit of extensive expert testimony to under.
stand the ability of a particular retarded witness to perceive and recall. On the other hand,
fear, depression, and a negative attitude toward sex, as the expert testified to in Kim, are
not such developmental characteristics and can be understood without expert testimony.
46. Tennessee v. Curtis, No. 114, (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 1981).
47. Id. at 13-14.
48. Id. at 14.
49. See Generally Goodman, The Child Witness: Conclusions and Future Directions
for Research and Legal Practice, 40:2 J. Soc. Issuza 157 (1984). The author indicates that
there is little current research about children as witnesses. No studies exist that demon-
strate that a child's memory, suggestability, and propensity to fantasize or lie is different
from that of adults. The author's only stated conclusion is that little is known about this
area. Expert testimony that a child's memory for "core events," although not perhaps for
1985)
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C. The Middle Approach
Some states have permitted expert testimony to rebut the im-
plicit defense of fabrication. The Supreme Court of Nevada, in
Smith v. Nevada,50 permitted an expert to explain the existence of
and reasons for delays in reporting by child sexual abuse victims.5'
Apparently, the lower court allowed the introduction of this testi-
mony during the prosecution's rebuttal case, or at least after the
defense had cross-examined the victim about the reason for the
delays in reporting. The Smith court adopted the same reasoning
as an Oregon court had used in Oregon v. Middleton. The Smith
court reasoned that, because people generally consider delays in
reporting crimes to be evidence of fabrication, the jury needs ex-
pert testimony to assist them in understanding the dynamics of
why child sexual abuse victims may wait years before reporting the
sexual crimes.52 The Washington courts permit this kind of testi-
mony under Petrich.5 3 Courts similarly allow this testimony in Cal-
ifornia and Arkansas. California v. Roscoe, a California appellate
court indicated that an expert familiar with recent professional re-
search on victims' reactions to sexual assault may testify about the
general principles applicable to these victims so long as the expert
does not give an opinion as to the credibility of the particular
victim.5
peripheral detail, is as good as an adult's would be helpful. Use of experts to discuss the
impact of traumatic events on memory also would be informative. Also, testimony by child
development experts on a child's ability to distinguish fantasy from fact at various ages
would be helpful. This evidence would be highly useful to juries in cases where young chil-
dren testify to sexual abuse. The testimony should not include the expert's opinion as to
whether the particular victim is able to distinguish fact from fantasy. Instead, it should
focus on the principles of the development of children in general. This kind of testimony is
comparable to permitting experts in the process of eyewitness identification to testify as to
the general principles related to memory and the ability to accurately identify an attacker.
Id.
50. Smith v. Nevada, 100 Nev. 123, 688 P.2d 326 (1984).
51. Id. at 123, 688 P.2d at 327.
52. Id. See also Oregon v. Pettit, 660 Or. App. 575, 675 P.2d 183 (1984). In Pettit, the
court followed the analysis in Oregon v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983). The
court specifically affirmed the trial court's admission of general testimony of a psychiatrist
regarding the ability of child sexual abuse victims to: (1) recall dates; (2) relate details; (3)
tell consistent stories; and (4) relate such incidents promptly. 660 Or. App. at 579, 675 P.2d
at 185.
53. Washington v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 683 P.2d 173 (1984). In Petrich, the
court held that evidence of the rape victim's inconsistent conduct in failing to report the
assault for eight months was not merely a collateral issue. Id. at 574, 683 P.2d at 179.
54. California v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1097, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45, 49 (1985). An
appellate court in Arkansas reached a similar result in Hall v. Arkansas, 692 S.W.2d 769
(Ark. Ct. App. 1985). In Hall, the prosecution offered an expert witness who primarily testi-
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A brief reference in a California case, California v. Dun-
nahoo,85 as well as language in an unpublished Washington case,"
imply that expert testimony is admissible to explain children's re-
luctance to tell the truth about sexual assaults upon them. Expert
testimony explaining this reluctance may be important because
children that are abused over a long period of time often will re-
veal the abuse only in "bits and pieces." 7 This may result in seem-
ingly inconsistent statements. The child may add more details as
he or she becomes more comfortable with the interviewers and ap-
preciates the distance now enjoyed from the offender. Expert testi-
mony also may be important to explain the readily observable phe-
nomenon among children to minimize the amount of sexual abuse.
It is not uncommon for a defendant to reveal far more abuse than
the child. Children tend to reveal only what they need to in order
to be protected from further abuse.
In the event the victim recants his or her statement, experts
should be permitted to explain the seemingly inconsistent and po-
tentially unreliable statements of the child. As the Supreme Court
of Oregon eloquently explained in Middleton," children commonly
recant in the time between disclosure of the sexual abuse and trial
for reasons that should compel courts to allow experts to explain
this phenomenom to the jury." The court analogized to other
kinds of crimes such as burglary, where if the victim recanted his
statement before trial, a jury likely would believe that he
fabricated the complaint." This again does not hold true for sexu-
fled to the demographics related to child sexual abuse. The expert testified that in a large
portion of the cases, the perpetrator is known to the child, tells te child not to reveal the
incident, and that the abuse often occurs in the home. The expert also described "the psy-
chological profile" of the perpetrator. The proferred evidence was of the variety that the
Washington courts rejected in Steward and Maule. The Hall court similarly rejected the
testimony because it was not offered to rebut a misconception about presumed behavior, but
to match details and demographics of most child abuse situations to the case at hand,
thereby proving the case at hand. Had the prosecution offered testimony to rebut the de-
fense counsel's contention that the child was lying because she did not reveal the sexual
abuse immediately, the factors relating to children's reluctance to tell then would have been
admissible.
55. California v. Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d 560, 577, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796, 804 (1984).
56. Washington v. Mitchell, No. 12040-9-I, slip op. at 2 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1984).
57. Id. at 4. See MacFarlane, infra p. 135 (Diagnostic Evaluations and The Use of
Videotapes in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMn L. Rzv. 135 (1985)).
58. Oregon v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983).
59. Id. at 437, 657 P.2d at 1220. Accord Washington v. Hardison, Nos. 12438-2-1, 13771-
9-I (Wash. Ct. App. July 19, 1984); Washington v. Turrey, No. 10206-1-I (Wash. Ct. App.
July 12, 1982).
60. 294 Or. at 435, 657 P.2d at 1219.
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ally abused children. Children may recant for a number of reasons
that include the guilt that they feel for the destruction of the fam-
ily and the potential imprisonment of a "loved one."' 1
As cases such as Petrich, Middleton, and Dunnahoo demon-
strate, in most states, prosecutors may introduce expert testimony
to explain the reasons for delays in reporting, recantations, and,
probably, inconsistent statements. Whether the prosecution may
introduce this testimony in its case-in-chief or when the defense
does not directly raise the issue will depend upon the evidentiary
rules and procedures of individual states as to when a party places
a fact in issue. Prosecutors should ask questions designed to elicit
an opinion from the expert that it is not inconsistent for the child
to delay reporting the sexual abuse rather than questions designed
to elicit a response that a delay is consistent with and indicative of
sexual abuse. When asking the expert why the delay is not incon-
sistent, a prosecutor should be able to get all the information he
needs without courting error. This line of questioning also is truer
to the theory behind the evidentiary rules dealing with expert wit-
nesses. The purpose of the testimony should be to show that a de-
lay in reporting does not mean the child is fabricating. Introduc-
tion of the testimony, however, does not serve as affirmative
evidence that the child was abused.
V. ADMISSIBILITY OP THE "CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE SYNDROME"
TESTIMONY
Many cases fail to draw the critical distinction between expert
testimony related to the dynamics of the relationship between the
victim and the defendant and "child sexual abuse syndrome" testi-
mony.es The syndrome testimony is very different and its admissi-
bility much less clear. The syndrome testimony is designed to show
that sexually abused children exhibit certain characteristics." The
implication is that if a particular child exhibits those characteris-
tics, the child was sexually abused." Because the defense in child
61. Id. at 436, 657 P.2d at 1219.
62. See Hall v. Arkansas, 692 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Ark. CL App. 1985).
63. See Kansas v. McQuillen, 236 Kan. 161, 168-69, 689 P.2d 822, 828 (1984).
64. In Hall, the sexually abused children exhibited both demographic and emotional
characteristics. Demographically, the prosecution elicited testimony that the child knew the
perpetrator, that the perpetrator had authority over the child, and that the abuse usually
occurred in the home. The prosecution also elicited testimony dealing with emotional chat-
acteristics; the child had difficulty discussing the abuse, because the perpetrator tofIft
child not to tell anyone. In addition, the expert also testified as to the "psychological PO-
file" of the perpetrator. 692 S.W.2d at 770.
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sexual abuse cases is usually that the crime did not occur and that
the child is making it up, evidence by an expert designed to show
indirectly that the child "was sexually abused" bolsters the credi-
bility of the child.
This kind of evidence is most similar to "rape trauma syn-
drome" testimony in forcible rape cases.5 Courts have more often
rejected than accepted "rape trauma syndrome" evidence as ap-
propriate evidence.6 Again, the courts have viewed this evidence
as. demonstrating that victims of rape often suffer from post-trau-
matic stress disorders such as nightmares, fear of men, and fear of
leaving their home. Therefore, if the alleged victim exhibits these
characteristics, the implication is that she was raped and did not
engage in consensual intercourse." The reasons that courts cite for
rejecting syndrome evidence include: 1) that it bolsters the credi-
bility of the victim; 2) that it invades the province of the jury; and
3) that it is unreliable.6 8 Although the evidence does have the indi-
rect effect of bolstering the credibility or corroborating the testi-
mony of the victim, most trial testimony, by sexual assault experts
or otherwise, has the same effect. If it did not, the party would not
offer it. The syndrome evidence does not invade the province of
the jury, because the jury, as the court noted in Middleton, is free
to disregard expert evidence.6 Finally, the evidence is certainly no
65. "Rape trauma syndrome" is a term labeling a rape victim's physical, psychological
and emotional reaction to being raped:
A rape victim suffers an invasion of her bodily privacy in an intensely per-
sonal and unsettling manner, triggering a number of emotional and psychological
reactions running the gamut from shock, fear, distrust, and anger to guilt,
shame, and disgust. As victims of this violent crime are now finally beginning to
receive some of the recognition and professional attention that has been so long
denied to them, the term "rape trauma syndrome" has developed to encompass
the recurring pattern of post-rape symptoms.
In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 38, 428 A.2d 126, 138 (1981).
66. See California v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984),
vacated, 140 Cal. App. 3d 267, 189 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1983) (expert testimony that a victim
suffers from rape trauma syndrome is inadmissable to prove that the victim was raped);
Minnesota v. Sadana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982) (expert testimony that a woman was
raped, because she exhibited symptoms of rape trauma syndrome, would unfairly prejudice
the defendant); Missouri v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984) (expert testimony that the
victim suffered rape trauma syndrome could result from other stressful situations, and
therefore, the prejudice to the defendant outweighed its probative value). Contra Kansas v.
Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982) (expert testimony that the alleged victim suf-
fered from rape trauma syndrome was relevant and did not invade the province of the jury).
67. gee Kansas v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1981).
68. See California v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984),
vacated, 140 Cal. App. 3d 267, 189 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1983); Minnesota v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d
227 (Minn. 1982); Missouri v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 604 (Mo. 1984).
69. See Oregon v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983).
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less reliable than any other type of expert testimony on mental
health, such as testimony on behalf of defendants in diminished
capacity situations. In diminished capacity situations, experts sub-
jectively interpret information that the defendant provides; yet,
courts routinely admit such testimony. 0 Thus, that the testimony
is based primarily or exclusively on a self report by a party should
not affect its admissibility.
Because of the practical considerations and implications of
this testimony, the courts in both Minnesota v. Myers71 and In the
Matter of Cheryl -1s permitted testimony about characteristics
and traits that sexually abused children exhibited. The Cheryl H
court permitted a psychiatrist in a dependency proceeding to tes-
tify that the child's post-injury behavior showed that she was sexu-
ally abused. The expert based his opinion on observations of the
child in therapy playing with anatomically correct dolls and obser-
vations of anxiety symptoms. The court permitted the psychiatrist
to testify that the child played with the anatomically correct dolls
in a way only sexually abused children do. In Myers, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota permitted a clinical psychologist, who treated
a seven-year-old girl abused by her mother's live-in boyfriend, to
testify that the girl exhibited characteristics that the psychologist
had observed in other sexually abused children: fear, confusion,
shame, and guilt, and that these factors often result in delays in
reporting.7" In addition, the Myers court permitted the psycholo-
gist to give her opinion on whether the child was telling the truth,
but only because the defendant "opened the door" by asking the
opinions of others.74
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Myers, acknowledged
that the indirect effect of the psychologist's testimony was to bol-
ster the child's testimony and demonstrate that the child was tell-
ing the truth. As with the Oregon court in Middleton, the Myers
court recognized that these same dangers also were present in
other expert testimony cases.75 The court observed that the sexual
abuse of children, particularly incest, places jurors at a disadvan-
tage, because it occurs over a long period of time and disclosure is
70. The "battered woman syndrome" defense cases are most analogous. See Washing-
ton v. Kelley, 102 Wash. 2d 188, 685 P.2d 564 (1984); Washington v. A~lery, 101 Wash. 2d
591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984); Washington v. Walker, 40 Wash. App. 658, 700 P.2d 1168 (15r.
71. 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984).
72. 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr 789 (1984).
73. 359 N.W.2d at 608-09.
74. Id. at 611.
75. Id. at 609.
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generally belated.7 6 The court cited Kim and distinguished rape
trauma syndrome cases on the basis that children and "mentally
retarded" persons present "unusual cases. '77
There are clear dangers in offering syndrome testimony. The
battle of the experts as to whether the child meets the characteris-
tics of child sexual abuse syndrome will frequently lead to conflict-
ing results after the child has endured multiple mental exams. If
evidence that the child exhibits "characteristics of an abused
child" is admissible, what about testimony that the defendant does
not exhibit "characteristics of a molester.""8
The most prudent and reasonable course of action is for the
prosecutor to avoid eliciting direct comments on credibility and
character traits and to artfully phrase questions that will elicit an-
swers that will explain why the dynamics of child sexual
abuse-shame, guilt, and fear-cause the child to delay reporting
the sexual abuse. One can make these points without opening up
the "battle of the experts." Abdicating the truth finding process to
"experts" is a bad policy that will result in purchased decisions
and bad procedure will subject the children to multiple psychologi-
cal exams.7"
76. Id. at 610.
77. Id.
78. See Kansas v. McQuillan, 236 Kan. 161, 689 P.2d 822 (1984). The McQuillen court
crystallized many of the issues regarding adult rape trauma syndrome. The majority af-
firmed Kansas v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982) and upheld the trial court's
admission of expert testimony that a victim suffered from rape trauma syndrome. The ma-
jority held that the existence of "rape trauma syndrome" is relevant and admissible and
that an expert may testify that a particular victim suffers from that syndrome. The majority
acknowledged but did not really address the arguments against the admission of this testi-
mony in California v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr 450 (1984), Mis-
souri v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984), and Minnesota v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227
(Minn. 1982).
The dissent, on the other hand, mounted a full attack on the evidence and expanded on
the above cases. The dissent focused on the problem of labeling a person as having "rape
trauma syndrome." By doing so, a court may thereby conclude that the event that caused
the symptoms was rape as opposed to consensual intercourse with some other attendant
emotional distress that produces symptoms consistent with rape or any other form of stress
related to the event such as guilt or fear of discovery.
79. The facts of Kansas v. McQuillen also evidence that concern over subjecting victims
to multiple psychological exams and setting up a battle of the experts is not an idle worry.
236 Kan. 161, 689 P.2d 822 (1984). In McQuillen, the state appealed the trial court's dismis-
sal of the charge due to violation of speedy trial because of the prosecutor's repeated re-
quests for continuances. Id. at 161-66, 689 P.2d at 823-26. The continuances were necessary
because the victim refused to complete the psychiatric exam for "rape trauma syndrome"
because of a "personality conflict" with the defense expert. Id. at 162, 689 P.2d at 824. No
one questioned the right of the defense to rebut the state's evidence by having a defense
expert conduct a psychiatric examination of the victim. One does not need much imagina-
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VI. CONCLUSION
We must avoid discarding basic principles of evidence in our
attempts to find solutions to the difficult problems of prosecuting
child sexual abuse cases."e Although the evidentiary rules have not
worked perfectly, they have worked well. The approach of courts
that admit expert opinion as to whether a particular witness is tell-
ing the truth is destructive to the fundamental principle that the
jury is the finder of fact and assessor of credibility. This approach,
which also admits evidence that a child suffers from "child sexual
abuse syndrome," permits experts to determine facts. Because in-
terpreting human behavior is far more of an art than a science,
most careful professionals should be reluctant to assume an abso-
lute ability to determine the facts. Conflicting expert evidence,
multiple mental health evaluations of victims, and proffered de-
fense testimony that the defendant does not meet the "perpetrator
profile" are just some of the expected negative side effects of this
approach.
The opposite position, however, that expert testimony on vic-
timization and victim dynamics is never admissible, is an equally
unwise course. There are peculiarities to these cases and to the re-
actions of the young victims that set them apart from the norm,
which courts should permit experts to explain. For example, abuse
that continues over a period of years, unreported lengthy delays in
reporting, gradual disclosure, and frequent recantations are just
some of the phenomena that set these cases apart." These phe-
nomena do not occur in the garden variety burglary, and juries
need to be instructed that they are not necessarily indicative of
lying and fabrication.
Therefore, the better approach is to utilize the increasing body
of knowledge that has been developed on victimization. One can do
this without relying on expert psychiatric testimony to bolster the
victims credibility or truthfulness. Neither is it necessary to engage
in the circular logic associated symptoms and syndromes. Rather,
tion to see the potential abuses of the victim's privacy rights that may become a part of that
examination.
80. See Graham, supra p. 1 (Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation:
Constitutional Ramifications Upon Evidentiary Innovations in Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 1 (1985)); Comment, infra p. 217 (Other Crimes Evidence To Iove the
Corpus Delicti of a Child Sexual Offense, 40 U. MiAM] L. REv. 217 (1985)).
81. See, e.g., Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d at 576, 683 P.2d at 180; see also MacFarlane, infru
p. 135 (Diagnostic Evaluations and the Use of Videotapes in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40
U. MiAMI L. REv. 135 (1985).
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prosecutors should use expert testimony to disclose the new knowl-
edge of victimization for the purpose of explaining to juries why
these victims have suffered silently for so long.
